Kishida exits
What next?
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Just when I thought it was safe to take a vacation, Kishida Fumio had to announce that he will not be seeking a second term as leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in September.1 His premiership will therefore end when his three-year term as party leader ends next month.
TOKYO -- Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said at a news conference on Wednesday that he will not seek reelection as president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.
"It is necessary to present a new LDP to the public in a clear way," Kishida said at a news conference. "The most obvious way to show that the LDP will change is for me to step down."
Kishida’s decision is not entirely surprising – when the Diet session ended in June it was hard to see how he survived – but the timing of this announcement is somewhat surprising, in that it appeared that a) Kishida’s approval ratings had improved ever so slightly; b) Asō Tarō, who is perhaps the closest thing the LDP has to a kingmaker at the moment, recently gave Kishida a vote of confidence; and c) it appeared that none of the potential contenders – LDP Secretary-General Motegi Toshimitsu, former secretary-general Ishiba Shigeru, Digital Affairs Minister Kōno Tarō, or Economic Security Minister Takaichi Sanae, among others – had an obvious pathway to victory in a contest against the incumbent prime minister.
Clearly, however, as Kishida canvassed the party, he must have seen that in fact he had no pathway to victory and that is only option was to bow out of the race.
There will be plenty to say about the LDP race that will unfold over the next five-six weeks – and much about the race is unclear, including even the date it will be held, which will not be settled until 20 August – but I think at this point we can say a few things about the race.
First, given how many candidates were preparing to enter the race when the incumbent prime minister was going to be in it, we should expect that the election will be a battle royale. It is possible to think of upwards of ten plausible contenders, with varying prospects of success, who could run in the race. In practice, the need to secure twenty nominations means that a ten-candidate field is unlikely, but the election is likely to feature a larger field, including some less well-known candidates vying to be the face of change in a moment of crisis for the LDP.
Second, there is not a presumptive favorite at this point. Of the names mentioned above, all have serious flaws. Motegi has substantial cabinet and party leadership experience, but is not well liked by his parliamentary colleagues, has been secretary-general during the LDP’s political scandals, and garners little support from the public. Ishiba has been highly popular with the electorate for years, but has struggled to win support for his parliamentary colleagues during his previous leadership bids and perhaps suffers from Henry Clay syndrome (the nineteenth-century US politician who lost three presidential elections and famously said, “I’d rather be right than president”).2 Takaichi ran a strong campaign in 2021 when she had the late Abe Shinzō campaigning on her behalf, but she may struggle without him and some reporting suggests she could even have difficulty securing the twenty endorsements. Kōno, meanwhile, has seen his public support fall but may also not have enough support from within the party. The upshot is that there is still room for other candidates – whether a generational change candidate like Koizumi Shinjirō or Kobayashi Takayuki, or an insider with dense relationships across the party like Katō Katsunobu – to shake up the race.
Third, with the LDP’s support slumping, the number of independents rising, and party leaders and junior backbenchers frightened of an anti-incumbency backlash, it is possible that LDP lawmakers opt for a more popular option like Ishiba or Koizumi. However, the LDP has rarely if ever treated its leadership elections as popularity contests, and despite the challenging circumstances, it is unlikely to do so this time. LDP lawmakers will likely weigh popularity, communication skills, and “freshness” along with relationships with colleagues and subordinates in the party, relationships with other parties (including Kōmeitō, which will be choosing a new leader around the same time as the LDP), policy experience, ideological orientation, and other qualities. The difference, of course, is that whereas once faction bosses largely made these assessments on behalf of their members, backbenchers will now have more room to make their own calculations. In practice, however, they will still take cues from senior lawmakers, whether Asō Tarō, the last surviving faction boss; former prime minister Suga Yoshihide, “boss” of the party’s reformist wing; or Kishida himself, along with other former faction leaders. Of course, the influence of LDP’s lawmakers — and senior party leaders — could be particularly strong given the likelihood that the election goes to a runoff, in which, according to the prevailing rules, lawmakers as a group will wield cast more votes than the party’s prefectural chapters.
These are just some initial, fragmentary thoughts about a not-unexpected-but-still-surprising development. I will have much more to say about the policy differences between the candidates and the policy implications of the election, about Kishida’s policy and political legacies and what he does next, and what the leadership election will mean for the outlook for the next general election, particularly as the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) holds its own leadership election in September. Much of my writing about the LDP election will be published here, at Observing Japan, so if you are not already subscribed, please subscribe below. But if you are an investor who has been thinking about a trial subscription to the timelier, forward-looking analysis I publish via Japan Foresight, now would be a great time to sign up.
Oddly enough, Kishida is now the third G7 leader to exit or announce an exit from office since the summit in June.
Ishiba’s new book is revealing this respect, and I am hoping to review it soon.