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It appears that Kōno Tarō is the first candidate to declare his intention to run in the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) leadership election. According to the Mainichi Shimbun, Kōno, a member of the Asō faction, met with faction boss and LDP Vice President Asō Tarō for two hours over dinner on Wednesday, 26 June, in which he reportedly informed Asō of his intention to run in September.
On paper, Kōno, who is currently serving as Prime Minister Kishida Fumio’s minister for digital transformation, remains a formidable candidate for the LDP’s leadership. He has a prominent pedigree; a lengthy resume that includes stints as foreign and defense minister; an international education (and superb English-language skills); and has consistently been among the LDP’s most popular politicians. His quirky social media presence could also be an asset for a party struggling to regain public trust.
In practice, however, Kōno may struggle to match even his performance in 2021, his second leadership bid, when he advanced to the second round against Kishida and lost by a 257-170 vote margin in the runoff.1 There are two issues Kōno must overcome in order to win the leadership.
First, as the 2021 results showed, that Kōno is not terribly popular among his colleagues in the parliamentary party. In the first round in 2021, he received the third-most votes from LDP lawmakers (86), behind Kishida (146) and Takaichi Sanae (114). In the second round, he was only able to muster 131 to Kishida’s 249. Kōno’s defeat in the second round was partially the result of the LDP right wing’s opposition to his candidacy. While Kishida sought to placate the right wing, Kōno mostly antagonized the right, staking out liberal positions on social issues like gay marriage, separate surnames for spouses, and the possibility of a woman inheriting the imperial throne. The right wing has also long worried about Kōno’s opposition to nuclear power and accused him of being soft on China.
There is little to suggest that Kōno will have more success with the LDP’s conservatives this time around than last time. Indeed, the recent kerfuffle in which a Chinese company’s logo was found on a document submitted to a Kōno-led task force on renewable energy regulations is unlikely to improve his standing with the right. The right wing’s votes, at least in the first round, may also be difficult to prize away from Takaichi, who is expected to run again.2
But the right wing’s hostility is not his only problem. His approach to Asō is in fact a sign of Kōno’s weakness. Asō did not throw his faction’s weight behind Kōno in 2021, and this time, Kōno has been courting Asō, not least because, with the Asō faction as effectively the last faction standing, its fifty-five members could be a crucial block of votes. However, as Kōno has moved closer to Asō, he has undermined his relationship with former prime minister Suga Yoshihide, informal leader of the LDP’s reformists who backed Kōno in 2021. Asō’s and the Asō faction’s support might be more valuable – by virtue of being better organized – but Kōno risks falling between two stools, failing to win the backing of either Asō or Suga. Asō, after all, has not indicated yet his opposition to Kishida’s reelection, despite his unhappiness with prime minister’s handling of the political reform legislation. Kōno’s distance from Suga could also mean that the latter backs another candidate as the standard bearer for party reform – Ishiba Shigeru or Koizumi Shinjirō, for example – crowding the lane that Kōno needs to occupy to win.
Second, it is possible that Kōno will not be able to use his popularity with the LDP’s grassroots supporters and the general public as a trump card. Kōno has unmistakably sunk in opinion polls tracking who voters think should be the next prime minister. In Mainichi’s poll conducted on 22-23 June, he was sixth, tied with Kishida at 5%, behind Ishiba, Takaichi, Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yōko, and Koizumi. Asahi polls, meanwhile, have recorded a steady decline in Kōno’s support. Kōno’s best argument is that his popularity with the public could save the LDP from a general election defeat and thus convince otherwise reluctant lawmakers to support his candidacy. But if he cannot point to broad public support, his path to victory is significantly harder.
Kōno may still have time to recapture the public’s support, which could encourage him to start campaigning sooner in the hope of generating excitement about his candidacy. The question is whether Kōno’s decline in the polls is due to his actions – for example, his management of the roll-out of the My Number card, which drew poor marks from the public – or is simply because other potential contenders (Ishiba, Kamikawa, etc.) have been more visible, drawing attention away from him. The former will be harder to fix before September; the latter is less of a concern, particularly if Kōno follows his dinner with Asō by formally launching a bid and reaping a first-mover advantage.
Thanks to his independent streak, Kōno has always seemed like a long shot to win the LDP’s leadership and assume the premiership, best thought of as an option to consider only if the LDP faced a crisis and needed to regain public support. That crisis has arrived, but Kōno still faces an uphill battle to convince his parliamentary colleagues that he is the right man for the moment.
Kōno also ran in the 2009 leadership election to decide who would lead the LDP in opposition, and finished a distant second to Tanigaki Sadakazu — and also finished third among lawmakers, behind Tanigaki and Nishimura Yasutoshi.
It is entirely possible that we see a repeat of 2021, with Takaichi using a strong showing in the first round as a bargaining chip with the candidate most acceptable (or least unacceptable) to the right wing.