The state of the LDP's leadership race

One candidate is in, two more are all but in, and many more are considering

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This is the first of what will likely be several posts on the LDP’s free-for-all leadership election. Subscribe below to follow all of my coverage of the LDP’s leadership election.

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The Liberal Democratic Party’s headquarters in Tokyo. Photo by author.

Even before Kishida Fumio announced that he would not be seeking another term at the helm of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the chances of a contentious race featuring multiple challengers was considerable.

Now, with Kishida out of the race, the LDP appears to be headed for a maximally large field as at least ten lawmakers have expressed interest in running and several have indicated that they have effectively lined up the necessary twenty endorsements and will formally announce their candidacies in the coming days. Once the party's factions began to dismantle themselves — ensuring they would not be able to serve as gatekeepers for the leadership race — this outcome was a distinct possibility, but it is still striking the degree to which virtually every candidate who has been mentioned as a post-Kishida option is pursuing a bid. The upshot is that the LDP is still heading for a free-for-all campaign, with no favorite.

The following is a guide to the potential candidates, sorted by whether they are from what I call the reformist, establishment, and conservative blocs. These are not formal designations but rather terms I use myself to refer to broad tendencies within the party that differ less on policy specifics — with some exceptions — than on political style. The reformists, clustered around former prime minister Suga Yoshihide, generally favor a more direct style of communication with the public, an emphasis on checkbook issues that improve household well-being, and what I think can be described as a "one nation," small-c conservatism that wants to manage change, not stop it and is generally more progressive on social and cultural issues like separate surnames for spouses, LGBT rights, and reforming the imperial household to allow inheritance via matrilineal descent.¹

At the other flank is the conservative bloc, which is committed to a right-wing ideology that calls for strong national defense, is reactionary on social and cultural issues (i.e. is determined to block progressive change on the aforementioned issues), and, importantly, is also opposed to fiscal consolidation and monetary policy normalization. Whereas Abe Shinzō assumed the leadership of this bloc after leaving the premiership — rallying it behind Takaichi Sanae in 2021, for example — this bloc has lacked a leader due not only to Abe's death but also the fallout from the Unification Church and kickback scandals. Not only is the Abe faction, which was not identical to but overlapped with the conservative bloc, in a state of dissolution, but the faction's leadership, including Hagiuda Kōichi and Nishimura Yasutoshi among others, have suffered serious setbacks that will limit their influence. Takaichi herself would like to inherit Abe's leadership of the bloc but has not been unopposed. The result could be a more more fractured conservative bloc that spreads its votes among more candidates.

Finally, the mainstream establishment bloc is the broad middle of the party, which can probably be divided between left-establishment (Kishida and his former Kōchi-kai) and right-establishment (Asō Tarō), with the former Nikai faction and Motegi faction, descendants of Tanaka Kakuei and Takeshita Noboru, somewhere in the middle. This section of the party is the most pragmatic, relative to the more idealistic types among the reformists and the conservatives.

What is important to note is that none of these blocs is big enough to dominant the party alone. A victorious candidate has to draw support from at least one other bloc other than his or her own. Thus, Kishida, a mainstream establishment type if ever there were one, ran to the right and allied with Takaichi to defeat the reformist Kōno in 2021. Given the large field, the most successful candidates will have to — in addition to appealing to the party supporters who will control half of the first round votes — draw support from outside their base to make it to the second round.

With that introduction, here's the movement among potential candidates, divided among these three blocs.

Reformists

Ishiba Shigeru had been flirting with a run even before Kishida left the race, and has now signaled that he has basically secured the twenty endorsements needed to file as a candidate. He will formally declare his candidacy on 22 August. His strengths and weaknesses are well known. He has long been the most popular politician in the LDP with grassroots supporters and the general public, which may be an asset at a time that the party is desperate to halt the decline in its support. In a recent Kyodo News poll, he received the support of 25.3% of the public overall, although his 21% support among LDP supporters was second to Koizumi Shinjirō’s 24.2%. But he has also struggled to build relationships with his fellow lawmakers (contributing to Abe's runoff victory over Ishiba in 2012) and, as the LDP's most unremitting critic of Abe in the LDP, could not only struggle to attract right-wing support but could also lead the right wing to back other candidates as "anyone-but-Ishiba" logic prevails.

Koizumi Shinjirō has also said that he is thinking seriously about a run but has not indicated when he will make a decision. Like Ishiba, the 43-year-old Koizumi is popular with voters, but his youth could be a liability within the party if older lawmakers resent his trying to jump ahead. He too may struggle to win right-wing support but could attract support from younger reformist and mainstream lawmakers, battling with Kobayashi Takayuki (see below) to be the avatar of generational change. His support from both the general public and the LDP’s grassroots supporters suggests that if he runs, he could be uniquely capable of combining grassroots and parliamentarian votes to advance to the runoff.

In his politics, Kōno Tarō belongs with the reformists, though as he has explored a possible run, he has sought the backing of Asō, to whose faction he has continued to belong. As a result, he has undermined his relationship with former ally Suga, who is resolutely opposed to the factions. But Asō did not support Kōno in 2021 and has reportedly said he cannot support him this time. His public support has also slipped, as discussed here. Kōno will nevertheless try to gather support from his Asō faction colleagues. There were reports that Kōno is prepared to announce this week, but he himself denied that he is ready. However, if Kōno does run, it could have secondary effects on Motegi Toshimitsu (see below), who has been angling for the support of Asō and his faction. Asō reportedly said that if Kōno is in the race, Asō cannot throw his faction behind Motegi, even if the faction is not backing Kōno en masse. Kōno has said that he will announce his candidacy on 26 August.

Conservatives

Takaichi Sanae rallies with supporters in Nara. Source: @takaichi_sanae on Twitter.

Takaichi Sanae, who, with Abe's support, surged to a third-place finish in 2021 (and received the second-most votes from lawmakers in the first round), has been open for months about wanting to run again, and is the right-wing media's candidate of choice. However, without Abe, her support within the party has been more middling. Her relationship with the former faction has not been good since she left the faction in 2011, she is in the middle of the pack when it comes to popularity with the broader public, and her appeal beyond the conservative bloc is probably limited. She is not without support — she spoke to 1700 supporters in her home prefecture of Nara on Saturday, 17 August, suggesting there may be some grassroots enthusiasm for her candidacy — but she still needs to secure the twenty endorsements and has not indicated when she might announce her candidacy. She has, however, begun attracting support from conservatives, including Nishida Shōji, who praised her as the only choice for expansionary fiscal policy and conservative beliefs; upper house member Yamada Hiroshi; and Ishikawa Akimasa, one of “Abe’s children” elected in 2012 (see below). She will likely get the twenty endorsements she needs to run.

Kobayashi Takayuki announces his candidacy for the LDP leadership. Source: @kobahawk on Twitter.

However, Takaichi could face a threat for right-wing votes from the 49-year-old Kobayashi Takayuki. Kobayashi, whose nickname "Kobahawk" offers a hint at his politics, is a leading member of the LDP's class of 2012, the lawmakers known as "Abe's children" who rode the late prime minister's coattails into office. In general, these lawmakers are more conservative than earlier generations and, as the LDP's support has fallen, they fear that their seats are more vulnerable and are therefore eager for the LDP to make real change. Kobayashi, who has only served in a single cabinet post — minister of economic security under Kishida, a post he relinquished due to the Unification Church scandal in 2022 — is significantly less experienced than his rivals. Nevertheless, the hunger for generational change among younger LDP lawmakers ensured that he had enough endorsements to become the first candidate to declare formally on Monday, 19 August. The question for Kobayashi is whether he can expand beyond the core of young lawmakers and also expand his heretofore low level of public support to more competitive levels. Nevertheless, the roughly 70 or so members of the "Good Country Association" (いい国の会), the group of 2012 Abe's children, is a sturdy launching pad. He enters the race with at least 25 lawmakers in his corner, not counting himself; twenty-four lawmakers from across the party’s factions — with a solid group of former Abe faction members led by Fukuda Tatsuo — joined him at his announcement, and Amari Akira has also indicated his support.

Establishment

The bulk of the field will come from the broad middle between the reformists and the conservatives, with each making their pitches to the two poles for support.

From the left-establishment, both Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa and Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yōko have indicated that they are considering entering the race. The two candidates both were members of the former Kishida faction and are close with the outgoing prime minister. Hayashi, who also ran in the 2012 LDP leadership election, has suggested that he is nearing the necessary twenty endorsements and will announce soon. Kamikawa, meanwhile, said she is “preparing her candidacy” but did not indicate when she might have enough support to declare formally. Kamikawa downplayed the significance of the presence of both Hayashi and Kamikawa in the race, saying “Now the factions don’t exist.”

I expect that these two candidates would run very different campaigns. Hayashi, greatly disliked by the right wing for being “pro-China” and a fiscal hawk, will likely look to the party’s reformists for support. Kamikawa, meanwhile, may look more to the right wing of the party, leveraging her service as justice minister under Abe to appeal to conservatives. At this point, neither seems likely to prevail. Both are older — at 71, Kamikawa would join Suga and Fukuda Yasuo as Japan’s only septuagenerian prime ministers — which may be at odds with the party’s mood. Meanwhile, neither is expected to receive significant support from the grassroots. Kamikawa enjoyed a brief surge in popularity in the spring when she first surfaced as a potential first female prime minister, but she has not built upon that initial surge. Hayashi, meanwhile, has ranked near the bottom among the public’s preferences for the next prime minister. Hayashi might be the most qualified to govern — in addition to serving as chief cabinet secretary and foreign minister under Kishida, he was agriculture and education minister under Abe, briefly economic and fiscal policy minister under Asō, and briefly defense minister under Fukuda — but this resume is probably not enough for Hayashi to emerge victorious. Their association with Kishida may also not help them as the party looks for change.

Meanwhile, Motegi Toshimitsu, LDP secretary-general and leader of one of two surviving factions, appeared to be all but running when Kishida was in the race, but has not made much progress since Kishida left the race. While Motegi has an impressive resume — he has been both foreign minister and economy, trade, and industry minister and has held two of the top three LDP posts (secretary-general and policy affairs chief) — his public support is virtually nonexistent and he has struggled to build relationships with his parliamentary colleagues, many of whom resent his abrasive personality.² His candidacy is unlikely to be helped by his age or by his service as secretary-general as the kickback scandal emerged, neither of which will help the LDP convince the public that it has changed. Neither of Motegi’s strategies to overcome these liabilities — appealing to Asō (see above, under Kōno) or arguing that he is best able to manage the US-Japan relationship if Donald Trump wins — has succeeded. Whatever Asō’s personal relationship with Motegi, he cannot throw his faction behind him, and Trump’s declining chances in the face of Vice President Kamala Harris’s surge means that LDP voters will likely be less receptive to his “Trump whisperer” pitch.

There are at least three other mainstream candidates exploring leadership bids. Katō Katsunobu, a member of the former Nikai faction and chief cabinet secretary under Suga, has said he is exploring a run. He has little public support and name recognition and at sixty-eight is among the older candidates. However, he may be better placed than most to appeal to lawmakers across the party. He was close with Abe, serving as one of his lieutenants during the wilderness years and then serving in the second Abe administration as deputy chief cabinet secretary and minister of health, labor, and welfare. He is close with Suga, which could result in support from the former prime minister and his circle. And his membership in the Nikai faction could also bring along some mainstream support. He is also an adept social media user, which could help generate more buzz if and when he enters the race.

Meanwhile, Saitō Ken, minister of economy, trade, and industry, ruled out a run when Kishida was still in the race but has since reconsidered. Still a relatively junior lawmaker at 65 — he was first elected in a by-election in 2006, and has been elected five time since — he has served as agriculture minister under Abe, and headed the Ministry of Justice and METI under Kishida. A career METI official with a master’s from the Harvard Kennedy School, Saitō is respected for his policy acumen but may not be able to overcome a lack of name recognition and a thick network within the party.³ He belonged to the former Ishiba faction, but with Ishiba in the race he may have few votes to draw on from his former factional colleagues.

Finally, there has been speculation that Noda Seiko, who finished a distant fourth in the 2021 leadership election, could also enter the race. While her name has been mentioned as a possible candidate, she herself has not indicated that she plans to run or that she has the endorsements needed to enter the race.

1. Given the prominence of Kanagawans in the flank, including Suga, Kōno Tarō, and Koizumi Shinjirō, I sometimes think of this as the Kanagawa school.

2. He is often described as engaging in “power harassment,” i.e. bullying behavior by a figure with authority.

3. The candidates in this field will likely have more degrees from US universities than any before. Kamikawa, Motegi, Saitō, Hayashi, and Kobayashi all have degrees from the Harvard Kennedy School. Koizumi received a master’s from Columbia University. Kōno’s undergraduate degree is from Georgetown University.