Rumbling on the right
The conservative anti-mainstream steps up its pressure on the prime minister, but its victory is far from assured
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On Wednesday, 14 May, a new headquarters attached to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) policy research council will hold its first meeting. This headquarters, called the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategic Headquarters,” will have Asō Tarō as its head, Takaichi Sanae as his deputy, and Kobayashi Takayuki as its acting secretary-general. Motegi Toshimitsu will be a senior adviser; former Abe faction bosses Nishimura Yasutoshi and Hagiuda Kōichi will have senior roles as well.
In short, this new organization looks like another step in the ongoing effort to reassemble the bloc that nearly propelled Takaichi to victory in the LDP’s leadership election in 2024, not least with Asō – whose late pivot to Takaichi helped her finish in first place in the first round – taking the helm of the organization.
That said, as Hagiuda has warned, if the LDP right does not unify behind a single candidate, it risks being shut out of power again. For the right, the biggest challenge they face is that neither Takaichi nor Kobayashi has indicated that they are prepared to set their personal ambitions aside in the interests of their bloc, agreeing to unite behind a single candidate who could prevail in a leadership contest. Whether the Asō-led headquarters will succeed in assembling a more coherent bloc remains to be seen.
But it is clearly a step in the direction of more intense competition between the Ishiba-led mainstream – with Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru drawing on support from members of his former faction, LDP Secretary-General Moriyama Hiroshi, former prime ministers Suga Yoshihide and Kishida Fumio (though the latter’s support could be soft to the extent that he harbors dreams of a comeback) and their followers, Koizumi Shinjirō, and other more moderate parts of the party – and the right wing anti-mainstream. Beyond the personality clashes between these blocs, the LDP’s mainstream and anti-mainstream are battling over foreign policy – the conservatives have questioned Ishiba’s handling of relations with the United States and China – and fiscal policy – the conservatives have embraced consumption tax cuts as part of their broader fiscal dovishness even as Ishiba has rejected them.1
Though the conservative anti-mainstream is sharpening its knives, the political situation is so uncertain that it cannot be assumed that they will be contesting a leadership election imminently. Ishiba’s opponents on the right wing have utterly failed to organize an effort to push him out before the upper house elections, and with each passing week it becomes increasingly unthinkable that the party can push Ishiba out without critically undermining its campaign. Even if the opposition brings matters to a head by passing a no-confidence motion later in the Diet session – forcing Ishiba to choose between resigning and calling a snap election – Ishiba may well choose a snap election instead of stepping down. Meanwhile, if Ishiba is able to lead the LDP to victory in the upper house elections – or in upper house and lower house elections, if a double election happens – the right wing may have missed an opportunity to push Ishiba out when he was at his most vulnerable.
Even if Ishiba is forced out – following a no-confidence motion or a poor electoral result – it is premature to assume that one of the anti-mainstream conservatives will sweep into power to replace him. The anti-mainstream bloc as a whole is still smaller than it was during the LDP’s leadership election in September due to losses in the general election; Takaichi has still struggled to broaden her appeal beyond the anti-mainstream; and Kobayashi has not yet made the case that he could be a more effective standard bearer. To be sure, it is not obvious who could succeed Ishiba from the mainstream wing, since Koizumi does not necessarily appear to be preparing for another bid in the near term and the prospect of Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa winning could be the kind of thing that leads the conservatives to unify. For all of the attention paid to the clash between the mainstream and anti-mainstream, the more likely outcome, particularly in a leadership election that featured a shorter campaign and excluded the rank-and-file membership (per party rules for special elections due to an unexpected vacancy), is a compromise candidate with the ability to draw support from both the mainstream and anti-mainstream camps. This could be Finance Minister Katō Katsunobu, a longtime lieutenant of Abe Shinzō’s who is close to Suga, is in Ishiba’s government, and is at odds with the anti-mainstream on fiscal policy; Motegi, who is close to the anti-mainstream right and served under Abe but is a major figure in his own right (and whose experience negotiating with Donald Trump could carry more weight than it did in last year’s election); or perhaps a dark horse like LDP policy chief Onodera Itsunori, who was in Kishida’s faction and supports Ishiba but also worked closely with Abe.
All this is to say that while the LDP’s right wing is getting organized ahead of the leadership election it believes is coming soon, it is premature to assume that it is poised to sweep back into power in Ishiba’s wake. Ishiba’s exit is by no means guaranteed; the party’s appetite for a combative right-wing leader is far from certain; and the right wing’s ability to unite behind a single leader, remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the shape of post-factional competition that was revealed in last year’s leadership election — the conflict between the conservative anti-mainstream and the broadly reformist mainstream — remains as a salient as ever.