Tobias---lots to digest in this but from an economic/financial standpoint does the recent weakness of the YEN provide yet another advantage for corporate Japan in this endeavor as it onshores previous hallowed out industries.As reported in Mainichi December 1,2022 "Japan Corporate Pretax Profits Hit -July-Sept.Record ,Capex Up 9.8%
Well done Toby. Reminds me of the debate over the Abe changes -- incrementalism versus a new doctrine to replace Yoshida. The economic dimension is crucial if it really means Japanese have given up on the promise of economic integration and globalization, though I dont think that is true, yet. Your summary list of the defense policy priorities is helpful - the focus on counter strike is a bit distorting. Among other things, as you note, to actually deploy that capability requires command and control and intelligence capabilities that JSDF does not have and won't have for a very long time, if ever. In reality, to actually carry out such a strike on North Korea or China can only take place within a joint command structure with the US and American defense planners would be wary of a Japan that had independent strike capability for fear of being drawn into an unintended conflict. Is Japan ready for that kind of joint command -- it means the NATOization of our alliance, or rather the Koreanization of it. And implicitly we would need to also coordinate with South Korea which is already very nervous about Japan striking Korea. On the other hand, if you read these documents carefully (and I am only beginning to do so) it also leads to more spending on independent Japanese capability, including the new 6th generation fighter project, that suggest the Japanese are not entirely sure they can rely on the US. Last but not least, as you note, the war in Ukraine is teaching many lessons and one of the most valuable is to remind us that wars are won mainly with logistics not fighting spirit (Japanese found that out in WWII). The increase in spending should really go to the unsexy stuff - arms stockpiles, hardening targets, transport. A final footnote on spending -- the reclassification of spending to NATO standards will actually take care of about half of the targeted level, so increased spending will be much less than advertised. You have also ended on a crucial note -- there is no real discussion yet of this among the Japanese public or even in the Diet. Let's see what happens next.
Thanks, Tobias. The angle that jumps out at me from your analysis is the economic basis of the documents. I hope you'll be explicating and clarifying that as the process goes along.
Great summary, Tobias! Pretty interesting that both Germany & Japan---U.S foes turned passivist Liberal International Order-upholding Allies---are finally taking steps to bolster their militaries. I guess it’s a sign that we really are reentering a world of “Great Power Competition” as the Pentagon & other foreign affairs wonks have been foot stomping for some time. But do you see any real political heartburn ahead for the LDP re: the constitution. Is Komeito fully on board? Or is this a slow walk type of thing? Also-- are Japan’s hopes of spending as much as 2% of GDP realistic or feasible? Seems they’re dealing with a lot of economic headwinds ahead of them. Long term demographics don’t bode well either. Even if they get to a point where they’re spending hundreds of billions of dollars a year on missiles and ships and equipment, what’s it all worth if you can’t recruit military personnel?
Tobias---lots to digest in this but from an economic/financial standpoint does the recent weakness of the YEN provide yet another advantage for corporate Japan in this endeavor as it onshores previous hallowed out industries.As reported in Mainichi December 1,2022 "Japan Corporate Pretax Profits Hit -July-Sept.Record ,Capex Up 9.8%
Well done Toby. Reminds me of the debate over the Abe changes -- incrementalism versus a new doctrine to replace Yoshida. The economic dimension is crucial if it really means Japanese have given up on the promise of economic integration and globalization, though I dont think that is true, yet. Your summary list of the defense policy priorities is helpful - the focus on counter strike is a bit distorting. Among other things, as you note, to actually deploy that capability requires command and control and intelligence capabilities that JSDF does not have and won't have for a very long time, if ever. In reality, to actually carry out such a strike on North Korea or China can only take place within a joint command structure with the US and American defense planners would be wary of a Japan that had independent strike capability for fear of being drawn into an unintended conflict. Is Japan ready for that kind of joint command -- it means the NATOization of our alliance, or rather the Koreanization of it. And implicitly we would need to also coordinate with South Korea which is already very nervous about Japan striking Korea. On the other hand, if you read these documents carefully (and I am only beginning to do so) it also leads to more spending on independent Japanese capability, including the new 6th generation fighter project, that suggest the Japanese are not entirely sure they can rely on the US. Last but not least, as you note, the war in Ukraine is teaching many lessons and one of the most valuable is to remind us that wars are won mainly with logistics not fighting spirit (Japanese found that out in WWII). The increase in spending should really go to the unsexy stuff - arms stockpiles, hardening targets, transport. A final footnote on spending -- the reclassification of spending to NATO standards will actually take care of about half of the targeted level, so increased spending will be much less than advertised. You have also ended on a crucial note -- there is no real discussion yet of this among the Japanese public or even in the Diet. Let's see what happens next.
Thanks, Tobias. The angle that jumps out at me from your analysis is the economic basis of the documents. I hope you'll be explicating and clarifying that as the process goes along.
Great summary, Tobias! Pretty interesting that both Germany & Japan---U.S foes turned passivist Liberal International Order-upholding Allies---are finally taking steps to bolster their militaries. I guess it’s a sign that we really are reentering a world of “Great Power Competition” as the Pentagon & other foreign affairs wonks have been foot stomping for some time. But do you see any real political heartburn ahead for the LDP re: the constitution. Is Komeito fully on board? Or is this a slow walk type of thing? Also-- are Japan’s hopes of spending as much as 2% of GDP realistic or feasible? Seems they’re dealing with a lot of economic headwinds ahead of them. Long term demographics don’t bode well either. Even if they get to a point where they’re spending hundreds of billions of dollars a year on missiles and ships and equipment, what’s it all worth if you can’t recruit military personnel?
Thanks for this - had been hoping to hear from you on this topic! Hope the Japan trip has been fruitful - certainly it appears that way.