Japan and the Ukraine question
The start of US-Russia talks reveals Japan's strategic dilemma
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Kishida Fumio, in New York for the UN General Assembly days before the end of his premiership, met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who awarded Kishida with the Order of Prince Yaroslav the Wise I degree in recognition of the prime minister’s efforts to support “Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
It was a fitting award for the outgoing prime minister. From the moment Russia launched its invasion in February 2022, Kishida and his government recognized that the invasion signaled not just a European security crisis but a global security crisis that challenged the prevailing international order. As Kishida said in a speech at the Tokyo Global Dialogue in February 2023:
This was exactly a harbinger of the end of the post-Cold War world. As Japan is facing a harsh security environment, I saw with my own eyes the reality of attempts to change the status quo by force being made and felt a strong sense of crisis that “Ukraine today might be East Asia tomorrow.”
His government not only moved quickly to scrap the late Abe Shinzō’s pursuit of a diplomatic breakthrough with Russia in the longstanding dispute over the southern Kuril islands, it joined with Japan’s G7 peers to impose sanctions on Russia; became one of the largest bilateral donors to Ukraine, including hosting a reconstruction conference in Tokyo in February 2024; provided nonlethal military aid to Ukraine’s war effort and accepted Ukrainian refugees, both significant departures from Japan’s prevailing policies; and used Japan’s presidency of the G7 in 2023 to maintain united support for Ukraine (which also involved Kishida visiting Ukraine in March 2023 and bringing Zelenskyy to Hiroshima to participate in the leaders’ summit).
Of course, as suggested by Kishida’s remarks above, the impact of the war in Ukraine on Japan went far beyond its contributions to the defense and reconstruction of Ukraine. The war arguably made possible the profound shift in Japan’s national strategy announced by the Kishida government in December 2022, serving as an impetus for Japan to take extraordinary steps to defend what Kishida referred to as the “free and open international order based on the rule of law” from the increasingly determined challenge from the alignment increasingly known as the CRINKs (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea). These steps include not only Kishida’s pledge to double defense spending and acquire new capabilities, but also deepening ties with NATO and European powers, elevating the US-Japan relationship to a global partnership increasingly involved in supporting global order, and expanding Japan’s commitment to supporting “Global South” countries. Japan’s support for Ukraine served as the pivot for a comprehensive strategic transformation.
Therefore, while the Trump administration’s decision to work with Russia to end the war in Ukraine – while leaving Ukraine and the European Union out of discussions and in fact making what were effectively predatory demands for economic concessions from Kyiv – has understandably been assessed primarily for its impact on Europe, it is important not to overlook the impact it could have on Japan.
Perhaps most importantly, the Trump administration’s position on Ukraine and Russia highlights the growing divergence between Japan and the United States on the importance of defending a “free and open international order.” If the United States is prepared to reward Russia’s aggression with territorial concessions and an end to its diplomatic and financial isolation – while effectively punishing Ukraine and Zelenskyy for engaging in legitimate self-defense – it would be a severe blow to the norm against territorial aggression that has been central to world order since 1945.
If the Trump administration continues to pursue this course of action, abandoning Ukraine and traditional US allies in Europe to pursue a partnership with Russia – to be sure, it is still possible that the administration will reverse course, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio for example acknowledging that EU sanctions on Russia mean that it will have to be consulted – it instantly leaves Japan in an uncomfortable position. It will remain dependent for its security on a United States that has ostentatiously abandoned the international order that the Japanese government has articulated is vital for the defense of Japan’s national interests, while also being sympathetic to – and committed to – the European countries left behind by the United States. And the Japanese government would be left wondering whether the Trump administration would be willing to draw a line against territorial aggression in Asia when it erased that line in Europe, notwithstanding language in the Ishiba-Trump joint statement expressing opposition to attempts to “change the status quo by force or coercion” in the East and South China Seas and Taiwan Strait. Perhaps US allies in Asia can view this is a “hard pivot” from Europe to Asia, the price of an “Asia First” policy. But how do they know that Ukraine today won’t be Taiwan, South Korea, or Japan tomorrow?
In the meantime, the Ishiba government will have to decide whether it stands by Ukraine – and its European partners – in opposing a settlement that excludes them from negotiations and undermines a rules-based order, or whether it quietly backs away from its support for Ukraine, gives its blessing to the Trump administration’s peace talks, and even makes its own attempt to restore relations with Russia. The Ishiba government, alarmed behind the scenes, has been understated but firm in its initial public response. Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi, for example, on Friday said that “it is important that a just and lasting peace be achieved as soon as possible with the full involvement of Ukraine as a party” and emphasized the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity. He added while in Munich over the weekend that the war cannot end “with Russia seen as the victor, which would send the wrong message not only to China but to the world.” Iwaya also talked with both Kaja Kallas, his EU counterpart, and NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte in Munich, reaffirming the need for close coordination. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru delivered a similar message about not rewarding Russia in parliamentary deliberations Monday.
The Ishiba government may pay little price for these gestures, but it could be costlier for Japan to continue to back Ukraine, particularly with financial resources, if the Trump administration persists in trying to make a peace agreement with Russia over the head of its democratic allies in Europe. Recall that Elbridge Colby, nominated to serve as under secretary of defense for policy, explicitly criticized Japan for focusing on Ukraine while going too slowly on strengthening its own capabilities. Would Japan be willing to invite US opprobrium – or worse – to oppose a US-Russia settlement that rewarded Russia, punished Ukraine, and left US allies in Europe alone to face Russia?
Ultimately, the choice facing Japan will continue to come into view. A narrow conception of Japan’s national interests perhaps suggests that the Japanese government should do whatever necessary to preserve the alliance with the US to maintain deterrence in East Asia, even if that means walking back its commitments to Ukraine and other European partners. However, the Japanese government’s commitment to a rules-based international order is not a passing fad or a rhetorical flourish but rather reflects the deep understanding that the prevailing order has guaranteed Japan’s security and prosperity, and that without it, Japan would be no less vulnerable to economic isolation and predation as other middle or small powers. While Japan will seek to postpone this choice for as long as possible, it may become increasingly difficult to avoid if the United States pursues a new strategic relationship with Russia (and perhaps the other CRINKs), threatens its neighbors and democratic allies, and seeks to accelerate its weaponization of economic interdependence, while crippling the foundations of US soft power. Ultimately, Japan’s leaders may have to decide what to do if they determine that Japan’s enduring alliance partner has joined the ranks of those countries that are, in the words of Japan’s 2022 national security strategy, “making attempts to revise the existing international order.”