To understand why, after nearly a decade away from blogging, I have decided to revive Observing Japan, I would point to the final paragraph of my 2020 book, The Iconoclast: Shinzo Abe and the New Japan.
Japan still faces a challenging future. The next generation of the Abe–Kishi dynasty may face more significant challenges than any of its predecessors. Japan’s most momentous decisions still lie ahead, as the planet warms, China’s power grows, US leadership fades, and the Japanese population ages. It is unknown whether his successor— whether that is his longtime rival Ishiba Shigeru, former foreign minister Kishida Fumio, current Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu, current Defense Minister Kōno Tarō, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide, or some dark horse—will convince the Japanese people and the world that Japan is still capable of great things in a turbulent and uncertain future.
Less than two years after Abe stepped down as prime minister for a second time, it increasingly appears that for much of his second administration, Abe was the beneficiary of a relatively tranquil period in international politics. By contrast, his successors, first Suga and now Kishida, have had to grapple with increasingly severe challenges.
For Suga, it was climate change, for, after years of relative inaction under Abe, the former prime minister committed Japan to decarbonization by 2050, launching an extensive process in the public and private sectors to determine how exactly this goal will be achieved.
Kishida, meanwhile, faces a tougher situation across the board. China has turned sharply inward even as it has continued to strengthen its military, forcing Tokyo to wonder whether the delicate balance between economic interdependence and security competition with China can continue. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has not only destabilized Japan’s relationship with Russia but served as a poignant warning of the possibility of war closer to home. The United States, meanwhile, wants to reassert its leadership in the region — and Japan and other partners want the U.S. to be engaged — but, thanks in no small part to domestic political dysfunction, has struggled to reassure its allies militarily or re-engage with regional economic integration. Closer to home, Kishida has to manage transition to a post-Covid growth environment, which was already complicated before the war in Ukraine induced a global supply shock in key commodities.
At the same time, thanks in large part to Abe’s activist foreign policy, the international community also expects more from Japan, as has been readily apparent during the Ukraine crisis. The United States and Japan’s other peers in the G7 expect that Tokyo will be actively involved in addressing global challenges, increasing the pressure on Japanese leaders to act decisively.
Accordingly, I am returning to blogging in order to chronicle, with some granularity, how Japan responds to this pivotal moment in the international system. The year ahead will feature an upper house election; an extensive review of Japan’s core national security policy documents; and a leadership transition at the Bank of Japan after ten years under Governor Kuroda Haruhiko. This blog will essentially serve as my research notes as I track these developments. As with the first iteration of Observing Japan, I will strive to point to news articles, official documents, books, and other Japanese-language sources that provide valuable context for understanding what Japan’s leaders are thinking and doing. Readers could also see some early notes on two book projects, including an introductory guide to Japanese democracy and a group biography/narrative history of Japan’s political leadership in the 1950s.
To those of you who have been reading me since the earliest days of my blog, welcome back. And to those who are reading me for the first time, I hope you enjoy what I write. I welcome feedback via comment, tweet, or email.
You mention Japan's response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine was in part driven by expectations of the United States and G-7 peers. How much of this emerges from Japan's reliance on external balancing against China?