How Takaichi won —— and what comes next

What we learned in the hours after the LDP's election

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My initial reaction to Takaichi’s victory is here:

Takaichi wins!

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Takaichi Sanae poses behind the LDP president’s desk on 4 October. Screenshot by author.

Takaichi’s victory

Takaichi addresses supporters following her victory in the LDP leadership election. Screenshot by author.

When thinking about how Takaichi achieved her upset victory, it starts with her overwhelming victory in the rank-and-file voting. Even before looking at the raw vote totals, it is worth stressing that although the rank-and-file electorate was smaller – the number of eligible voters fell 13% between the 2024 and 2025 leadership elections – turnout may have been slightly higher, exceeding 68%. There were 90% as many votes cast as in 2024 despite the overall decline in the size of the electorate.

But her victory among the rank-and-file voting was decisive. While polls showed that her grassroots strength remained, there were some questions about how deep her support was among the dues-paying LDP members. The scale of her victory put those doubts to rest, as she won with just over 40% of the vote. Her votes were also well distributed, as she bested Koizumi – finished first or second – in 36 of 47 prefectural chapters. This not only gave her an edge in the runoff but was likely decisive in convincing LDP lawmakers that she has the best chance of generating excitement among the party’s voters.

That said, she may also have benefited from poor strategic decision making by the LDP’s reformists. Hayashi’s robust campaign – he took 20.9% of the rank-and-file vote and had the second-most lawmaker votes in the first round with 72 to Koizumi’s 80 – may well have cemented Takaichi’s victory, since it likely divided the “Ishiba vote” to Koizumi’s detriment. It is fair to say that Hayashi hindered Koizumi far more than Kobayashi – who took only 5.14% of the vote, breaking quadruple digits in only ten prefectures – hindered Takaichi. The combined Koizumi-Hayashi vote surpassed the Takaichi vote in at least 26 prefectures that Takaichi won. While there is no guarantee that Koizumi would have gained all of Hayashi’s votes if the latter had not run (or vice versa), these numbers suggest that one should be careful about drawing sweeping conclusions about the LDP’s electorate.

Meanwhile, to the extent that the number of prefecture chapters mattered, even with the “Ishiba vote” divided, Koizumi could have doubled the number of prefectural chapters he won from 11 to 22 if he had gained an additional 3,503 votes in 11 prefectures in which Takaichi’s margin of victory was less than 500 votes. In another eight, Koizumi could have flipped the prefecture with an additional 500-900 votes. If Koizumi had gained an additional 8,788 votes – 1.40% of the total number cast – across these 19 prefectures, he would have won thirty of the 47 and the conversation about the race would be different. This is not to diminish Takaichi’s victory, only to suggest that it would have taken a relatively small shift for the race to have potentially unfolded differently. Indeed, Nikkei’s analysis of the second round of voting suggests that lawmakers were paying particularly close attention to how their home prefectures voted, and this may have been a particularly important factor for some of Hayashi’s parliamentary supporters. (Mainichi, meanwhile, fleshed out how the popular vote influenced Asō Tarō’s behavior.)

Takaichi’s press conference

In her press conference on Saturday, Takaichi struck a more pragmatic tone across the board. She stressed that the priority for her government will be to move as quickly as possible to address public concerns about the cost-of-living crisis, including removing the temporary gasoline tax; sought to downplay her reputation as a fiscal dove who would abandon fiscal responsibility; signaled her openness to continuing talks with the Constitutional Democrats on refundable tax credits; walked back a comment during the campaign about the possibility of renegotiating the bilateral trade deal with the US, saying instead that if any issues arise that should be addressed within the agreement’s consultative mechanism; and fell back on an old formulation about whether to worship at Yasukuni Shrine, saying she would make a decision at the “appropriate time.” That said, she may also raise eyebrows with a remark about the government’s responsibility for both fiscal and monetary policy, stating that while it is up to the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to decide on “appropriate measures,” the government and the BOJ need to move in lockstep. It remains to be seen whether this points to potential friction between a Takaichi government and a BOJ cautiously moving towards resuming interest rate hikes. As Azumi Jun, the CDP’s secretary-general, said Saturday, she has not actually provided clarity about how she intends to conduct economic policy.

Meanwhile, Takaichi also talked about the makeup of her administration. Perhaps not surprisingly Takaichi said that she could give posts to former Abe faction members – say, Hagiuda Kōichi or Nishimura Yasutoshi – who were punished for their roles in the kickback scandal, saying that they have already been punished by the party and “purified” by winning their seats again. She also suggested that she could opt for an “all party” lineup rather than a leadership team centered on the party’s right. She may already be leaning to naming Suzuki Shunichi, son of Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō, Asō’s brother-in-law, and former finance minister, as LDP secretary-general, potentially a gesture towards a more conventional party lineup.

On the whole, the extent to which she is able to govern pragmatically – after a career spent as an uncompromising conservative – may determine whether she is able to survive in the premiership.

The LDP-Kōmeitō coalition

Kōmeitō leader Saitō Tetsuo speaks with the press about his initial meeting with Takaichi. Screenshot by author.

Kōmeitō leader Saitō Tetsuo met with Takaichi on Saturday and expressed to her his party’s concerns about three issues: her stance on worshipping at Yasukuni Shrine and her approach to regional diplomacy more broadly; her position on regulating corporate political donations; and her approach to “co-existence” with Japan’s foreign population. He also expressed opposition to Ishin no Kai’s “auxiliary capital” proposal, which perhaps indicates – to the extent that the auxiliary capital bill is non-negotiable for Ishin no Kai – that he was telling Takaichi that she may have to choose between a coalition with Kōmeitō or a coalition with Ishin no Kai. An expanded three-party coalition may not be an option.

The past, present, and future of Kōmeitō

Opposition parties

Ishin no Kai co-leader Yoshimura Hirofumi said that if Takaichi formally approaches his party about coalition negotiations, they will “naturally” discuss a coalition with the LDP. He was careful to stress that the priority is implementing policies and suggested that the negotiations will not necessarily be easy. He expressed his appreciation for Takaichi’s policy expertise – and her Kansai roots – but also praised Koizumi’s commitment to reform, gesturing to the possibility that a partnership with Koizumi may have been a more comfortable alliance for Yoshimura.

Democratic Party for the People (DPFP) leader Tamaki Yūichirō was more muted in his response, welcoming the opportunity for negotiating with the ruling parties on some of his party’s priorities – raising the income tax exemption and ending the temporary gasoline tax – but said that the test for Takaichi will be how quickly she can act. He also added that he thought Kobayashi Takayuki was the closest to the DPFP in policy terms. That said, the DPFP may be more open to cooperation than Tamaki let on in his remarks and may yet find its way into a coalition government.

Sanseitō leader Kamiya Sōhei greeted Takaichi’s victory by stating that his party will not hesitate to cooperate with her government on policies that uphold Japan’s national interests and move Japan’s politics in a “anti-globalist” direction.

Further reading

Will Takaichi’s victory advance gender equality?

Was Koizumi’s campaign undone by excessive caution (and that “fake comment” scandal)?

The scene at a watch party in Takaichi’s home prefecture of Nara.

A collection of Takaichi quotes from the campaign.

A soft profile of Takaichi from the Yomiuri Shimbun, including her love of the Hanshin Tigers and a lovingly maintained Toyota Supra.

Tōyō Keizai’s analysis of Takaichi’s victory and what comes next.

The finger pointing begins in Team Koizumi.